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CO. V. SUPERIOR OIL
(3S C.2d 751; 249 P.2d 21]

GRAYBILL DRILLING

Co. 751

[L. A. No. 22492. In Bank. Oct. 21, 1952.]

GRAY HILL DRILLING COMPANY (a Corporation), Ap-'
pellant, v. THE SUPERIOR OIL COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.

)

[la,lb] Accord and Satisfaction-Tender of Check-Acceptance
by Creditor.-Where a claim is disputed or unliquidated
and the tender of a check or draft in settlement thereof is
of such a character as to give the creditor notice that it must
be accepted in full discharge of his claim or not at all, the
retention and use of such check or draft constitute an accord
and satisfaction, notwithstanding the creditor protests against
accepting the tender in full payment.
[2) ld.-Character of Dispute.-For the principle of accord and
satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claini,
there must be a bona fide dispute between the parties, but it is
immaterial whether the dispute has a solid foundation.
(3) ld.-Tender-Acceptance.-For the principle of accord and
satisfaction to apply, the debtor must make it clear that
acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that
it shall be in full satisfaction.
(4) Conflict of Laws-Contracts.-Where a written contract and
oral modification thereof were made and to be performed in
another state, and the acts relied on to establish an accord
and satisfaction took place in that state, the substantive law
of that state rather than that of California governs.
(5) Accord and Satisfaction-Character of Dispute.-Where there
is some doubt as to defendant's owing plaintiff anything under
an oral modification of a written contract to drill an oil well,
defendant's insistence on settling, if at all, for approximately
40 per cent of plaintiff's claim provides no evidence that its
dispute was not in good faith and hence does not preclude an
accord and satisfaction based on plaintiff's acceptance of a
check for such sum in full settlement of the claim.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Affirmed.
[1) Acceptance of remittance by check purporting to be "in full"
or acompanied by indications of debtor's intention that it be 1'10
regarded, notes, 34 A.L.R.1035; 75 A.L.R. 905. See, also, Cal.Jur.2d,
Accord and Satisfaction, ~~ 9,39; Am.Jur., Aecord and Satisfaction,
~§ 21, 26.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Accord and Satisfaction, § 11; [2,5]
Accord and "Satisfaction, § 7; [3] Accord and Satisfaction, § 10;
r4] Conflict of Laws, § 4.
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Action to recover balance due for drilling of an oil well.
Judgment of nonsuit affirmed.
Lee Combs and John Barry for Appellant.
Hanna & Morton, Harold C. Morton, Edward A. Penprase,
B. W. Burkhead and Max K. Jamison for Respondent.
TRAYNOH, J.-Plailltiff appeals from a judgment of nonsuit entered in its action to recover the balance alleged due
from defendant for the drilling of an oil well. The evidence,
stated most favorably to plaintiff, is as follows: Plaintiff
entered into a written contract with defendant to drill an oil
well in Oklahoma. The contract was negotiated with defendant's agelits Smith and Kunau and sent to California, where
it was signed by defendant's vice-president Cody. It was
then returned to Oklahoma, where it was executed by plaintiff. It provided that the ,veIl should be drilled to the Gibson sand, which was expected to be encountered at or below
6,500 feet. Plaintiff was to receive $5.25 per foot for the
hole drilled up to 6,500 feet in depth, and $6.00 per foot
thereafter, plus certain amounts for standby time. Drilling
proceeded until a depth of somewhat over 4,000 feet was
reached, at which depth a steep dip in the geological formation was encountered, and drilling became much more expensive. Plaintiff's vice-president and general manager Frederickson then informed defendant's Oklahoma agents that
plaintiff would be unable to continue with the drilling unless
more favorable terms could be agreed upon to compensate it
for the unforeseen expens(>s and difficulties. Kunau, defendant's Oklahoma drilling and production superintendent, orally
agreed to a modification of the contract whereby plainti1f
should be paid at the contract rate of $5.25 per foot for the hole
drilled up to that time, and on a cost plus basis thereafter.
Drilling continued until a d(>pth of 7,254 feet was reached,
at which time the well was abandoned as a dry hole.
Plaintiff then submitted three statements to defendant.
One was for $96,872.63, described as the actual cost of
the w(>]1; th(' s('coml was for $100.12] .42, based upon "footage contract to 4000', actual cost from 4000' to 7254"'; and
the third was for $47,697.46, the amonnt tllat would have been
earn(>d uuder the terms of the original written contract.
Defendant Sl'llt plaintiff n check for the latter amount, which
was 8l'l'(>pted Hnd cashed after defendant's agent Smith as-
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sured Frederickson that it was not intended as a final settlement. Thereafter further negotiations took place betwe~n
Frederickson, acting for plaintiff, and various officers and
agents of defendant. These negotiations terminated when
defendant's vice-president Cody met Frederickson in Oklahoma and offered him $23,000 in final settlement of their acrount. Frederickson said he would accept the $23,000, but
not in final settlement. Defendant then forwarded its check
for $23,000 together 'with a letter stating, "We are enclosing
check No. 5305 in the amount of $23,000.00 in full and final
settlement of balance of all claims and costs for drilling
Craig No. 1 well in Garvin County, Oklahoma. This check
is being sent in accordance with request of Mr. J. C. Cod~T."
The voucher attached to the check bore the notation that it
was "in full and final settlement of balance of all claims and
costs for drilling Craig No.1 . . . . " Plaintiff cashed the
check and later instituted this action for the balance it claims
is due under the terms of the oral modification of the written contract. At the close of plaintiff's case defendant successfully moved for a nonsuit on the grounds that there was
no proof that its Oklahoma agents had authority to modify
the written contract, that the oral modification was invalid
for lack of consideration and because it was not in writing,
and that the evidence established an accord and satisfaction
.
as a matter of law.
[la] The defense of accord and satisfaction was recently :
considered in Potier v. Pacific Coast Lbr. Co., 37 Ca1.2d 592 '
[234 P .2d 16], in a case factually similar to the present one ..
This court said, "The great weight of authority undoubtedly
supports the rule that where a claim is disputed or unliquidated and the tender of a check or draft in settlement thereof
is of such character as to give the creditor notice that it must
be accepted 'in full discharge of his claim' 01' not at all, the
retention and use of such check or draft constitute an accord
and satisfaction (1 C.J.S. § 34, p. 528) ; and it is immaterial
that the 'creditor protests against accepting the tender in
full pa~'ment' (1 Am.Jur. § 26, p. 228), for ill such case 'tllP.
law permits but two alternatives, either rE'ject or aecept hl
Il('{'ordance with the condition' ('Vi11istoll on Contracts. l'<'Y.
ed., vol. VI, § 1856, p. 5220 . . . ). [2] Of course, for the principle of a('f~ord anrl satisfactiou to apply ill dispositioll (If Ull
un1illuidated elaim, there mnst be a 'bona fide dispute' bt't.w('(\n the pal'tips (Stub v. Belmont, 20 Ca1.2d 208, 218 r12-1
P.2d 826]), but 'it matters not that tht're was no solid fOUll-
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dation for the dispute' as the test is whether 'the dispute was
honest or fraudulent' (B. &'; W. Eng·ineering Co. v. Beam, 23
Cal.App.164,171 [137 P. 624] ... ).[3] Also, the debtor must
make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to
the condition tha1 it shall be in full satisfaction. (Citations.)"
(37 Ca1.2d at 597.)
[4] In the present case the written contract and the oral
modification thereof were made and to be performed in Oklahoma, and the acts relied upon to establish all accord and
satisfaction took place in that state. Accordingly, it is the
substantive law of Oklahoma rather than that of California
that must be considered. (Mercantile Acceptance (Jo. v.
Frank, 203 Cal. 483,485 l26j P. 190, 5i A.L.R 696) ; see Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 332, 373.) Although there
is language in some of the Oldahoma cases that indicates
that an aerord and satisfaction may be defeated if the creditor indicates that he does not intend to accept a check in
full payment (see e.g., Deming Inv. Co. v. McLau.ghlin, 80
Okla. 20 [118 P. 380, 381] ; Ge11try v. Fife, 56 Okla. 1 [155 P.
246, 247-248]), it appears that when all of the conditions
mentioned in the Potter ease are satisfied, the Oklahoma cases
hold that an accord and satisfaction has been established
whether or not the creditor protests tbat he is not taking
the check in full payment of his claim. (Davis v. Davis, 103
Okla. 83 [229 P. 479, 483) ; K-llbatzky v. Pittsburg Plate Glass
Co., 119 Okla. 236 [249 P. 412, 415] ; see Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Richter, 173 Olda. 489 [49 P.2d 94, 96] ; (Jommercial Union ASSUT. Co. v. Creek Cotton Oil Co., 96 Okla. 189
[221 P. 499, 502] ; Sonditen v. Allied Refininu Co., 84 Okla.
47 [202 P. 316, 317].) [1b] Accordingly in the present
case, since. the check was tendered on the clearly expressed
condition that it was in full settlement of plaintiff's disputed
claim, and plaintiff accepted and cashed it, it is immaterial
that Frederickson stated at the time that he was unwilling
to accept it in full payment.
[5] Plaintiff contends, however, that there was evidence
from which it could be inferred that defendant was not acting
in good faith in disputing its claim. It relies on the following
facts: Defendant did not question the authority of its Okla110ma a~ent to make the modification agreement until the time
of trial. Only once during the negotiations was any question
raised as to whether in fact. the oral agreement had been
made. At no time was any complaint made of the accurac!
of the cost figures plaintiff submitted as the basis for addi
o
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tional compensation under the terms of the oral modification.
Defendant's vice-president offered no explanation of how he
arrived at the compromise figure of $23,000 other than to
state that he thought it was fair.
If there was no dispute as to the validity of the oral
modification agreement, it maybe assumed that defendant's
failure to question the accuracy of plaintiff's cost figures
and its insistence on settling for a fraction of the amount
claimed, would provide some evidence that the dispute over
the amount due was not in good faith. (See Berger v. Lane,
190 Cal. 443, 448 [213 P. 45].) Also, defendant's failure to
question the authority of its Oklahoma agent to execute a
modification of the contract until the time of the trial, and
its failure, except in one instance during the course of the
negotiations, to question whether the oral modification was
in fact made, may provide some eyidence that it did not seriously dispute either of these issues.
Even if it is assumed, however, that there was no dispute
over these factual questions, a serious legal question remained as to wllether or not tIle oral modification was valid.
After the well was completed, defendant was confronted
with a claim based upon an oral modification of its written
contract whereby the economic risk of drilling the well had
been shifted from plaintiff to defendant. The result of this
shift was approximately to double the cost of the well that
defendant had agreed to pay. Plaintiff had obtained the
modification by pointing out to defendant's agents that it
would be forced to breach its contract if relief were not
granted. Under these circumstances defendant was in a
position seriously to contend that the oral modification was invalid because of lack of consideration and because it was
not in writing (see OkIa.Stats.Ann., tit. 15, § 237), and
it could reasonably resist the payment of any amount not due
under the terms of the written contract. It is unnecessary
to decide whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's contention that the oral modification was invalid. In
view of the doubtfulness of defendant's owing plaintiff anything under that modification, its insistence on settling, if
at all, for approximately 40 per cent of plaintiff's claim, provides no evidence that its dispute was not in good faith.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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